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 In his article The Political Economy of Local Vetoes,
1
 Professor David 
Spence undertakes a comprehensive and insightful study of state and local 
legislation governing the use of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) to produce 
shale oil and gas.  He focuses particularly on local zoning ordinances 
banning or limiting hydraulic fracturing that conflict with state laws 
encouraging shale oil and gas development.  This focus is appropriate 
because, as he notes: “within the last few years more than 400 local 
governments, from California to Texas to New York, have enacted 
ordinances restricting or banning within their borders the use of hydraulic 
fracturing . . . to produce natural gas or oil from shale formations.”2  This is 
true despite the fact that state law has historically regulated oil and gas 
activities in the United States.
3
  As a result, state courts are increasingly 
forced to decide state–local preemption issues when drillers and royalty 
owners challenge local zoning ordinances that restrict or ban fracking and 
when local governments and their citizens challenge state laws that attempt 
to override local restrictions or bans on fracking.  Spence also discusses the 
growing number of regulatory takings claims by producers and landowners 
against states and local governments, arguing that such bans on fracking 
result in a regulatory “taking” of the private property entitling the owner to 
 

 Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I received helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this response from John Dernbach and John Echeverria. 
1. David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 351 (2014). 
2. Id. at 351.  
3. Mike Soraghan, Protecting Oil from Water—The History of State Regulation, GREENWIRE, 
Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059957631, archived at http://perma.cc/5V4T-
YXT4. 
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just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
 Many of these state–local conflicts are arising for the first time with the 
shale gas “boom” because shale gas resources are often located near 
population centers and because some of this development is occurring in 
states and in parts of states that have not been oil-and-gas producing areas for 
nearly a century, if ever.
4
  Moreover, the concerns over fracking operations 
are numerous and cover a broad range of environmental and aesthetic 
impacts that are generally within the purview of both state and local law.  For 
instance, Spence summarizes the potential impacts of fracking operations 
local governments are responding to as including groundwater 
contamination, surface-water contamination, localized earthquakes, 
groundwater depletion, air pollution, excessive truck traffic, noise, 
interference with quality of life, and disruption of local ecosystems.  While 
Spence states that a few of these concerns are not supported by scientific 
evidence, the fact remains that many of these concerns are driving local 
governments and their residents to challenge state efforts to promote fracking 
because they believe that they are in a better position than the states to 
balance the benefits and costs of fracking. 
 In comparing the relative benefits and drawbacks to local or state 
primacy, Spence’s focus is necessarily on legislation and whether state or 
local governments are best positioned to legislate with regard to shale gas 
development.  But what about the courts?  Is there an independent role for 
the courts in shaping the development of intergovernmental authority 
conflicts and regulatory takings claims associated with shale gas 
development in the United States apart from the statutory interpretation 
issues that often predominate these types of lawsuits? 
 This response focuses on the independent role the courts may play in 
resolving fracking disputes between states and local governments and in 
regulatory takings claims in states with developed public trust doctrines.  In 
his article, Spence mentions the public trust doctrine and codification of 
public trust principles in state constitutions but tends to minimize their 
importance.  He discusses the 2013 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, 
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
5
 in which the court 
 
 4. See, e.g., J. DANIEL ARTHUR ET AL., WATER RESOURCES AND USE FOR HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE REGION 1–4 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.dec.ny. 
gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/GWPCMarcellus.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KEL6-8MA7 
(describing how the Marcellus Shale Region encompasses several major population centers and is 
within states that have never had a need to regulate oil and gas development); NATIONAL CONF. OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: A 
POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE (June 2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/energy/ 
frackingguide_060512.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2AJ4-EDL8 (describing widespread 
nature of natural gas development and legislative concerns over development activities in 
populated areas). 
5. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
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invalidated a state statute that prevented local governments from banning or 
limiting shale gas development.
6
  The plurality based its decision on the 
state’s environmental rights amendment to its constitution.7  According to the 
court, that amendment, which codifies common law public trust principles, 
serves as a limit on the state legislature’s ability to override local government 
efforts to limit development for environmental protection purposes.
8
 
 Spence recognizes the importance of the decision in Pennsylvania but 
concludes that it is “a bit of an outlier in this field” and that its effects “on 
state–local preemption doctrine elsewhere remain to be seen.” 9   This 
response explores in more detail the role of the public trust doctrine in 
resolving intergovernmental disputes over shale oil and gas development as 
well as in regulatory takings claims.  It suggests that state constitutional 
codifications of the public trust doctrine in some states, coupled with robust 
judicial interpretation of the common law public trust doctrine in other states, 
have the potential to minimize significantly the ability of states to override 
local government resistance to shale oil and gas development.  The public 
trust doctrine may also play a role in regulatory takings claims involving 
shale oil and gas development by providing “cover” to state and local 
governments if their limits on development are intended to protect public 
trust resources. 
 Part I of this response provides background on the public trust doctrine 
as it exists under state common law, in state constitutions, and in state 
statutes that have codified the common law doctrine.  Part II discusses the 
cases to date that have addressed public trust doctrine issues in the context of 
shale oil and gas development.  Finally, Part III offers some additional 
observations regarding the role of the public trust doctrine in judicial 
resolution of state–local disputes and regulatory takings claims associated 
with shale oil and gas development. 
I. The Public Trust Doctrine 
 The public trust doctrine is an ancient Roman doctrine that holds that 
there are certain natural resources, notably submerged lands under tidal and 
navigable waters, that are subject to government ownership and must be held 
in trust for the use and benefit of the public as well as future generations.
10
  
Prior to the 20th century, U.S. courts used the doctrine primarily to preserve 
public access to water and shoreland areas for commerce, recreation, 
transportation, and fishing purposes.  During that time period, the primary 
 
6. Id. (plurality opinion). 
7. Id. at 978. 
8. See id. at 956–57.  A fourth justice concurred in the holding based on substantive due process 
grounds. Id. at 1001 (Baer, J., concurring).  
9. Spence, supra note 1, at 374–75. 
10. See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and 
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 702–03 (2006).  
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case articulating the scope of the public trust doctrine was Illinois Central 
Railroad v. Illinois,
11
 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1892 that the 
public trust doctrine barred the Illinois legislature’s action in 1869 to sell 
more than 1,000 acres underlying Lake Michigan in the Chicago Harbor to 
the railroad.
12
  The Court held that the title the state held to the submerged 
lands at issue was different in character from other state lands that could be 
sold into private ownership.
13
  Instead, these submerged lands were a “title 
held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of 
the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein 
freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.”14  Although the 
state could allow some private economic use of such lands, the uses must be 
ones that “do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and 
waters remaining.”15 
 In the 1970s, the public trust doctrine became important for 
environmental protection purposes when professor Joseph Sax wrote an 
influential law review article suggesting that the doctrine could act as a 
ground to compel states and other governmental entities to protect water and 
other natural resources from development and other threats.
16
  Since that 
time, many states, such as California, Hawaii, New York, and Louisiana, 
have developed a robust common law public trust doctrine; other states, such 
as Pennsylvania and Montana, enshrined public trust principles in their state 
constitutions; and yet others have codified the public trust doctrine in 
statutory provisions.
17
  Thus, in many states throughout the nation, common 
law, state constitutions, state statutes, or all three serve to limit state 
legislative or executive efforts to sell, impair, or interfere with public trust 
resources.  In some jurisdictions, notably California, the public trust doctrine 
does not require a complete ban on development that would impact public 
trust resources.  Instead, the doctrine requires government officials to take 
public trust resources into account to the extent feasible in making decisions 




11. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
12. Id. at 405 & n.1, 455. 
13. Id. at 452. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556–57 (1970). 
17. See Klass, supra note 10, at 723–26 (exploring state statutory schemes incorporating the 
doctrine). 
18. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (Cal. 1983) (“The state has 
an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water 
resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”); Holly Doremus, Groundwater and 
the Public Trust Doctrine, California Style, LEGAL PLANET (July 21, 2014),  http://legal-
planet.org/2014/07/21/groundwater-and-the-public-trust-doctrine-california-style/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/SDG4-YYFK (asserting that public trust uses need only be protected to the extent 
feasible). 
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 Although many states have limited their common law doctrine to water-
based resources, others such as California and New York have extended the 
doctrine to protect wildlife, scenic, and other land-based public trust values.  
Moreover, states with constitutional or statutory public trust provisions have 
included a broad scope of resources within the doctrine’s protection.19  For 
instance, the California courts have found that the common law public 
doctrine limits surface water withdrawals that impact lakes; imposes limits 
on wind turbines that may kill raptors such as eagles, hawks, and falcons; and 
limits groundwater withdrawals that adversely impact connected surface 
waters.
20
  The California courts have also confirmed that the public trust 
doctrine imposes limits on local governmental action as well as state 
governmental action.
21
  In Louisiana, courts have used the doctrine to limit 
the construction and operation of a hazardous waste disposal facility.
22
  In 
New York, courts have held for over a century that the public trust doctrine 
protects parkland, and there are numerous New York decisions, including 
one in 2013, preventing development on parkland based on the doctrine.
23
 
 With regard to state constitutional provisions, Pennsylvania amended its 
state constitution in 1971 to provide that: 
 
 The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the 
environment.  Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to 
come.  As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
24
   
 
 
19. Klass, supra note 10, at 707–14. 
20. See Doremus, supra note 18 (reporting on a California trial court decision in July 2014 
holding that groundwater pumping that affects flows in a navigable stream are subject to the public 
trust doctrine). 
21. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 599–602 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008) (holding that the public trust doctrine places obligations on counties to consider impacts on 
raptors and other birds when approving and regulating wind turbine projects but that the plaintiffs 
could not succeed on their claims because they sued the private wind farm operators rather than the 
counties that owed the legal duty under the doctrine). 
22. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1159–60 (La. 1984) 
(recognizing that that the public trust doctrine imposes a duty on state actors to provide meaningful 
review of the impact of their decisions on natural resources and the environment); Ryan M. 
Seidemann, The Public Trust Doctrine and Surface Water Management and Conservation: A View 
from Louisiana (Mar. 17–19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing potential impacts of 
public trust doctrine on development of shale resources in Louisiana). 
23. See, e.g., Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. City of New York, 984 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 
2013) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and holding that development of a 
composting facility in a park violates the common law public trust doctrine and citing earlier similar 
cases). 
24. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
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When Montana amended its constitution in 1974, it included a provision that 
granted an “inalienable” right to a “clean and healthful environment” and 
placed a duty on the state and private parties to “maintain and improve a 
clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future 
generations.” 25   Montana courts have used the Montana constitutional 
provision to hold that a nonprofit group could sue the state environmental 
agency and a mining company to prevent discharge of contaminants into a 
river that would adversely impact water quality and species even though the 
agency’s rules allowed the discharge. 26   Thus, constitutional public trust 
provisions can override conflicting state statutes and regulatory decisions. 
 As for statutory public trust provisions, Minnesota, Michigan, and a few 
other states enacted environmental rights statutes in the 1970s that codified 
the public trust doctrine and expanded its scope to include land, water, soil, 
animal, mineral, aesthetic, and other natural resources.
27
  For instance, the 
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA) gives any person the right to 
seek injunctive relief in court against any person “for the protection of the 
air, water, land, or other natural resources” in the state whether publicly or 
privately owned, from “pollution, impairment or destruction.”28   “Natural 
resources” include, but are not limited to, “all mineral, animal, botanical, air, 
water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical resources” as 
well as state-owned scenic and aesthetic resources.
29
  Minnesota courts have 
interpreted MERA broadly to protect birds, trees, historic buildings, marsh 
and wetland areas, quietude in residential areas, drinking water wells, 
wetlands, and the wilderness experience in forests.
30
  To protect such 
resources, Minnesota courts have enjoined a gravel pit operation, a shooting 
range, tree harvesting, and highway projects, among others.
31
  Like 
California, Minnesota law limits local government action as well as state 
action that may impact protected natural resources.
32
 
 The discussion above shows how the public trust doctrine can serve as a 
judicial “sword” to limit actions by private parties, local governments, and 
state governments that may adversely impact protected public trust resources.  
But the public trust doctrine can also serve as a “shield” for local or state 
actors when they attempt to limit private action that may adversely impact 
 
25. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
26. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1242–43 (Mont. 1999). 
27. Klass, supra note 10, at 719–27. 
28. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.02–03 (West 2014). 
29. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02 (West 2014). 
30. Klass, supra note 10, at 722–23. 
31. Id. 
32. See, e.g., State ex rel. Archabal v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 421–26 (Minn. 
1993) (holding that MERA prevented a city from demolishing historic building to build a new jail); 
Cnty. of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn. 1973) (holding that MERA prevented a 
county from building a highway through a wetland area where feasible and prudent alternatives 
were available). 
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public trust resources.  For instance, courts have rejected regulatory takings 
claims against state and local governments on public trust grounds when 
governments have amended instream flow regulations, prohibited the filling 
of wetlands, restricted urban development, banned personal watercraft on 
certain waterbodies, denied a permit for a pier, or otherwise taken actions to 
protect public trust resources that impact private property rights.
33
 
 Because of the scope of resources subject to public trust protection and 
the wide range of surface water, groundwater, land, and aesthetic impacts 
associated with shale oil and gas development, it is hardly a stretch to 
envision use of the public trust doctrine to override state statutes that 
encourage development to the detriment of protected resources or that limit 
local governments’ efforts to restrict such development.  The next Part 
explores the application of the public trust doctrine to shale oil and gas 
operations to date. 
II. Potential Public Trust Doctrine Limits on Shale Oil and Gas 
Development 
 Many of the states with public trust protection of natural resources as a 
result of common law, statute, or state constitution have significant shale oil 
or gas resources.  These include California, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New 
York, Louisiana, and Montana.  Although not all of these states have applied 
public trust protections to limit shale oil and gas development, several state 
legislatures and courts have addressed the issue. 
 For instance, in Pennsylvania, in 2012, the legislature enacted a new law, 
“Act 13,” that required all local ordinances to “allow for the reasonable 
development of oil and gas resources” and imposed uniform rules for oil and 
gas regulation.
34
  Local governments and residents that had enacted zoning 
ordinances limiting hydraulic fracturing that were more stringent than Act 13 
challenged the law on various grounds, including an argument that it violated 
Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.  In a 2013 decision, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court plurality agreed and invalidated many 
provisions of Act 13.
35
  It held that “a new regulatory regime permitting 
 
33. See Klass, supra note 10, at 734–43 (discussing cases involving regulatory takings claims); 
Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1021, 1031 (2012) (same). 
34. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3303–3304 (West 2014) (providing that state environmental 
laws “occupy the entire field” of oil and gas regulation to the exclusion of all local ordinances, that 
state law preempts and supersedes local regulation of oil and gas operations, and that all local 
ordinances must allow for the reasonable development of oil and gas resources, and imposing 
uniform rules for hydraulic fracturing in the state that prevent local governments from establishing 
more stringent rules). 
35. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion); see also 
John C. Dernbach et al., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Examinations and 
Implications (Widener Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-10), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412657, archived at http://perma.cc/F77T-PWGW.  
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industrial uses as a matter of right in every type of pre-existing zoning 
district is incapable of conserving or maintaining the constitutionally-
protected aspects of the public environment and of a certain quality of life.”36  
Moreover, under the law, “some properties and communities will carry much 
heavier environmental and habitability burdens than others,” which is 
inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s obligation to act as a trustee.37  This 
result is inconsistent with the obligation that the trustee act for the benefit of 
“all the people.”38 
 In interpreting its Environmental Right Amendment, the plurality found 
that the obligation to preserve protected resources was imposed not only on 
the state but on local governmental entities as well.
39
  As a result, the 
plurality found that by limiting the ability of local governments to protect 
public trust resources for their citizens, the state legislature not only failed to 
meet its own obligation under the state constitution but also prevented local 




 While in Pennsylvania it was the state legislature that acted to promote 
hydraulic fracturing by limiting local zoning laws, in Vermont, in 2012, the 
state legislature banned hydraulic fracturing throughout the state.
41
  Notably, 
in hearings leading up to the new legislation, supporters cited the public trust 
doctrine as a reason to impose the ban.
42
  In 2008, the state had enacted 
legislation declaring that groundwater was a public trust resource subject to 
judicial protection under the common law public trust doctrine.
43
  In 2012, 
legislators expressed concern that if shale gas operations resulted in 




 In Louisiana, which has a robust common law public trust doctrine as 
well as shale oil and gas resources, the state responded to numerous 
criticisms that massive amounts of water were being used for hydraulic 
fracturing purposes without considering competing public trust values.
45
  As 
a result, in 2010, the Louisiana attorney general and other state agencies 
issued a guidance memorandum stating that based on the public trust 
 
36. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979 (plurality opinion). 
37. Id. at 980. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 977–78. 
40. Id. 
41. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1390 (2013). 
42. Carl Etnier, Vermont First State in Nation to Ban Fracking for Oil and Gas, VTDIGGER.ORG 
(May 4, 2012), available at http://vtdigger.org/2012/05/04/vermont-first-state-in-nation-to-ban-
fracking-for-oil-and-gas/, archived at http://perma.cc/6UY-4JPM. 
 43. 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 624–30. 
44. See id. (discussing how the ban on fracking could help to protect Vermont’s air, land, and 
water). 
45. Seidemann, supra note 22, at 2–6. 
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doctrine, any use of running waters in the state must be approved by the 
state’s attorney general’s office and the state Department of Natural 
Resources and that the state had an affirmative duty under the doctrine as 
well as the state constitution to ensure that consumptive uses of the state’s 
waters were not threatening protected resources.
46
 
 The same concerns have been expressed in California, which has a robust 
common law public trust doctrine and may also possess significant shale oil 
and gas resources.  Although fracking is allowed in both on- and off-shore 
wells in the state and in federal waters off the coast, many in the state are 
concerned about the environmental impacts of fracking on inland and coastal 
waters as well as on the natural resources and wildlife those waters support.
47
  
A California court also held in 2014 that the public trust doctrine limits 
adverse impacts to groundwater that are connected to surface waters 
protected by the doctrine.
48
  Because California has well-developed case law 
on the public trust doctrine and courts have used the doctrine to limit a wide 
range of industrial activities and development, any future expansion of 
fracking operations will inevitably encounter claims based on the public trust 
doctrine.  Moreover, any effort by the state in the future to override local 
fracking bans will face good arguments that the public trust doctrine prevents 
such an override of local authority and requires both state and local 
authorities to balance the benefits of fracking with the potential impact on 
protected resources. 
 In Michigan, the courts have limited both the common law public trust 
doctrine and the state’s codification of that doctrine in the Michigan 
Environmental Policy Act so that they apply only to “navigable waters” and 
not to non-navigable surface waters or to groundwater.
49
  As a result, some 
fracking impacts on waters within the state will place an obligation on state 
officials to protect those water resources while other types of impacts solely 
to groundwater or non-navigable waters will not.  Nevertheless, because the 
Michigan statute places obligations on state officials and the state legislature 
to protect state natural resources, this could limit state legislative and 




46. Id.; Memorandum from James D. Buddy Caldwell, Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney 
Gen., and Scott A. Angelle, Sec’y, Dep’t of Natural Res., to All State Surface Water Manager (Feb. 
5, 2010), available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/conservation/groundwater/Appendix_F. 
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V2JF-MCDP. 
47. Patrick McGreevy, Groups Pressure Legislature to Back California Fracking Moratorium, 
L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-groups-increase-
pressure-for-moratorium-on-fracking-in-calif-20140522-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
5ZBP-PLLL. 
48. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
49. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N.A., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 222 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
50. See, e.g., Katharine Hoeksema, Fracking the Mitten and the Public Trust, MICH. ENVTL. 
L.J., Fall 2012, at 14, 23–27 (2012). 
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 As Spence notes, in addition to state–local preemption issues 
surrounding fracking, there are a growing number of regulatory takings 
claims against state or local governments that have chosen to limit fracking 
activities to the potential financial detriment of drillers and landowners.  
Plaintiffs’ groups in New York and Colorado have already filed lawsuits 
alleging that government restrictions on fracking result in a taking of private 
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
51
  In the famous case of Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. New York City,
52
 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that any regulatory taking claim must consider the nature of the 
governmental interest at stake, the magnitude of the economic impact on the 
property owner, and the degree to which the regulation interferes with the 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations of the property owner.  In a later 
and controversial case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,
53
 the 
Court broadened the circumstances under which a regulation could result in a 
taking of property—namely, where a regulation would deprive the owner of 
“all economic use” of the property.  The court found that a taking could 
occur under those circumstances unless “background principles” of state 
nuisance and property law would have prohibited the development separate 
and apart from the challenged regulation.  In the absence of such 
“background principles” of state property law, state or local regulation on its 
own did not necessarily prevent a landowner from developing reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations that could result in a taking requiring 
compensation. 
 Significantly, there are strong arguments that the public trust doctrine is a 
“background principle” of common law that would allow states and local 
governments to limit fracking without constituting a taking.  The public trust 
doctrine dates back to Roman law, and has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court since the Illinois Central case in 1892.  In that case, the Court found 
that the Illinois legislature’s decision to invalidate its sale of the Chicago 
Harbor to the railroad was not an unconstitutional taking of private property 
because the public trust doctrine prohibited the conveyance in the first 
place.
54
  Since the Illinois Central decision, both federal and state courts in 
Washington, New York, and Rhode Island have rejected regulatory takings 
 
51. See Spence, supra note 1, at 397–98 & nn.200–01 (discussing lawsuits); Ellen M. Gillmer, 
Envrios Revels in N.Y. Victory as Industry Plans Next Steps, ENERGYWIRE (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/07/01/stories/1060002192, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
UXU3-VP5U (reporting on New York Court of Appeals decision holding that state oil and gas law 
does not preempt local bans on fracking activities and discussing related lawsuits by landowners 
and drillers that such bans constitute a taking). 
52. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
53. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
54. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892). 
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claims in part based on the public trust doctrine.
55
  State courts could easily 
find that state or local limits on fracking designed to protect state waters and 
other public trust resources do not result in takings because the impacts of 
fracking on water resources, aesthetic resources, and other public trust 
resources would be prohibited under the public trust doctrine as a matter of 
common law or as incorporated into state statutory or constitutional 
provisions codifying the doctrine. 
 In sum, there are several examples of state courts already applying the 
public trust doctrine to shale oil and gas development.  There are many 
others that have a history of using public trust principles as a check on 
legislative action (or to defend state action in response to takings claims) as a 
matter of common law, state constitutional law, statutory law, or all three.  
As noted earlier, in most cases, the public trust doctrine will not act as a 
complete ban on shale oil and gas development in any particular 
circumstance.  Instead, the doctrine will require state and local actors to 
fairly consider the impacts of shale oil and gas development on public trust 
resources.  Pennsylvania is an example where the state supreme court found 
the legislature had gone too far in promoting shale oil and gas development 
in a way that prevented state or local actors in the future from providing the 
necessary balancing of interests.  In other states, the legislative action may 
not be so extreme.  But the fact remains that the public trust doctrine should 
be recognized as having the potential to play a significant role in limiting 
shale oil and gas development either by placing limits on state legislation to 
override local bans or to defend local or state efforts to protect public trust 
resources in the face of regulatory takings claims. 
III. The Future Role of the Public Trust Doctrine in Conflicts Over Shale Oil 
and Gas Development 
 Parts I and II explained the contours of the public trust doctrine and how 
it has been used to limit shale oil and gas development to date.  This Part 
returns to Professor Spence’s article and questions what role, if any the 
public trust doctrine should play in addressing intergovernmental conflicts 
over shale oil and gas development.  In other words, how should courts use 
the public trust doctrine in determining whether to place limits on state 
action, local action, or both with regard to shale oil and gas development? 
 
55. Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 981–84 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a 
city’s denial of a shoreland permit application was not a taking because “background principles” of 
Washington law, including the public trust doctrine, would restrict the development at issue based 
on its potential impact on tidelands); W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (Sup. 
Ct. 1998) (concluding that the public trust doctrine as well as the state constitution supported 
constitutionality of a state law restricting development in Long Island); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005), on remand from 533 U.S. 606 
(2001) (finding that state denial of permit to fill eighteen acres of salt marsh was not a taking 
because landowner’s action would constitute a nuisance and was limited by the state public trust 
doctrine, which had been incorporated into the state’s constitution). 
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 As Spence details so well, local governments and state governments 
bring different strengths as well as different shortcomings to regulating shale 
oil and gas development.  He concludes that local governments do not 
capture all the local costs and benefits associated with fracking within their 
borders while states do capture most of those impacts.
56
  This might lead one 
to conclude that states are therefore in a better position to regulate, and thus, 
state law should preempt local regulation.
57
  But Spence also points out that 
the costs and benefits are not distributed evenly throughout the states, and the 
costs of fracking will often fall more heavily on local communities, which 
supports their ability to regulate.
58
  He ultimately concludes that a rule 
against preemption may be the best path to encourage bargaining that would 
cause state and local governments to resolve differences over fracking on 




 In some cases, local governments will act to promote shale oil and gas 
development above and beyond state law and in more cases local 
governments will act to prevent development in opposition to state law.  In 
either situation, however, in many states the public trust doctrine will require 
both state and local governments to consider the impact of development on 
public trust resources.  This requirement acts as a significant check on 
legislative discretion and thus provides additional support for local bans that 
may conflict with state efforts to promote shale oil and gas development.  At 
the same time, however, the public trust doctrine also provides support to 
states like California and New York, as well as to local governments 
throughout the nation, that may want to move more slowly on shale oil and 
gas development because of concerns associated with the impact of such 
development on protected public trust resources.  In other words, not only 
can the public trust doctrine play a role in resolving state–local disputes over 
shale oil and gas development, it can also help both state and local 
governments balance the benefits and costs of such development and place 
greater emphasis on protecting public trust resources in the process. 
 Significantly, the lawsuits to date surrounding shale oil and gas 
development, and particularly those involving the public trust doctrine, 
highlight the need for state and local governments to obtain as much 
information as possible regarding the condition and existence of public trust 
resources and the potential impact of development on those resources.  Thus, 
government and private studies, research, and assessment will be critical in 
resolving the inevitable disputes arising from the conflicts between 
development and public trust resources.  This process is particularly 
important not only for litigation purposes but also because it provides a set of 
 
56. Spence, supra note 1, at 383. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 384. 
59. Id. at 393–94. 
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opportunities for resolving conflicts or potential conflicts without the need 
for litigation.  With better information on the impacts of shale oil and gas 
development on public trust resources, state and local governments can in 
some circumstances work together and find common law ground within a 
framework that includes public trust principles. 
 In sum, it is possible that the public trust doctrine may play a significant 
role in resolving state–local conflicts over regulation of shale oil and gas 
development.  The Robinson Township case is the first significant use of the 
doctrine in this context but it will not be the last.  As noted above, while the 
doctrine is not a presence in all states with shale gas resources, it is a well-
developed presence in many of them.  Legal scholars are already debating the 
impact of Robinson Township outside of Pennsylvania,
60
 but the important 
point is that even though Robinson Township is based on a fairly unique 
provision of that state’s constitution, the principles in the case can easily 
apply in any state that recognizes public trust principles as a matter of 
common law, statute, or state constitutional law. 
 
60. See, e.g., Ellen M. Gilmer, Enviros Push “Public Trust” as Trump Card Over Oil and Gas 
Influence, ENERGYWIRE, Aug. 15, 2014, http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/08/15/stories/ 
1060004530, archived at http://perma.cc/C3CQ-HN6T  (discussing views of legal experts over the 
impact of the Robinson Township case on shale gas development outside of Pennsylvania). 
